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KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: THE ILLUSION OF EMANCIPATORY 
PEDAGOGIES WITHIN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION1 
Roger Firth 
The increased calls for transformation in response to the socio-ecological 'crisis' and the movement towards 
more sustainable societies; the dramatic political changes in South Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere; the 
epistemological shifts in the conceptualisation of science, education and research, and the paradoxes of the 
world of the late twentieth century provide the context for this paper. The need for educational organisations 
and educators to make an effective curriculum response to environmental and development concerns legitimises 
socially critical approaches to environmental education and a concern with processes of social change. We are 
faced, therefore, with dilemmas of personal, professional and political change: the need for transformation of 
both actors and structures. 
The paper highlights the unquestioned assumptions which underlie growing calls for social transformation and 
considers the significance of a socially critical orientation to environmental education in relation to processes 
of social change. This orientation draws on the critical theories underpinning 'liberatory' or 'emancipatory' 
pedagogies,akeyconcern being the need to 'empower' perceived 'marginalised' groups and individuals and 
for 'transformatory intellectuals' to support 'capacity building' among such marginalised groups and 
individuals. 
I highlight a number of concerns I have about this orientation and emphasise the need to re-think some aspects 
of the project. The theoretical considerations of the paper are borne out of particular instances of trying to 
actualise the aims of a socially critical environmental education, both within my professional practice as a 
teacher educator, and as a result of a school based collaborative action research project with a small group of 
primary teachers (this is reported elsewhere). 
INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
There is a growing public awareness that human 
economic activity is increasingly undermining its 
own future and that of other life-forms, through 
unsustainable patterns of living. This growing 
awareness, often articulated as an environment-
development 'crisis' 1 has led to calls for changes 
to improve the situation. In the World Conservation 
Strategy (IUCN, 1980) scientists asked for changes 
in the behaviour of entire societies. Others have 
called for a 'new world ethic' (Fien, 1993a; 
Milbrath, 1984), a 'new ecological ethic' 
(Schleicher, 1989) and changes in those world views 
which sanction domination and exploitation (Huckle, 
1993; Merchant, 1983). Indeed, so profound are the 
desired changes that they have been termed social 
transformation (Janse van Rensburg, 1994:3). The 
environment has become a mf\jor issue in the 
political arena both nationally and internationally. 
These calls for social transformation tend to offer a 
vision of a future world which meets the needs of all 
the global community without undermining the 
integrity of the biosphere: 
Integration of environment and development 
concerns and greater attention to them will lead 
to the fulfilment of basic, improved living 
standards for all, better protected and managed 
ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. 
No nation can achieve this on its own, but 
together we can - in a global partnership for 
sustainable development. (UNCED, Agenda 21, 
1992) 
Over the last two decades environmental education 
has progressed from relative obscurity to being 
regarded as one of the key instruments in response to 
the socio-ecological 'crisis' and in the development 
of more sustainable societies (Sterling, 1994:8). 
Intergovernmental reports have endorsed the role of 
education and educational research in helping to 
bring about the extensive social changes needed in 
moving towards more sustainable societies. 
Calls for social transformation need to be placed 
within wider discussions of social change, which 
have pointed to changes in a range of elements of 
contemporary society. Huyssen (1986:181) refers to 
a noticeable shift in sensibility, practices and 
discourse formations which distinguish a post-
modem set of assumptions, experiences and 
propositions from that of a preceding period. By its 
very nature, talk of social change on such a grand 
scale is imprecise, even speculative. It is nuclear 
whether these changes mark the end of the modern 
era and the advent of postmodernity, or at least the 
beginning of the end, or a more radical phase of 
modernity (what Giddens, 1990 has called 'high 
modernity' and Beck, 1992 calls 'reflexive 
modernity'). Yet there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the changes which nnderlie the concept 
of postmodernity are real and that while it is difficult 
to gauge their extent and future, they are more likely 
to continue than not (Gilbert, 1995:13). 
UNQUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS 
The calls for global transforn1ation bring into sharp 
focus the question: to what extent does 
enviro1llllental education and enviro1llllental 
education research have a potential to contribute to 
social change? Can schools be sites of transgressive 
practices (McLaren, 1994)? Or is this rhetoric 
merely 'over-claim', the over extension of the 
capabilities of environmental education? Popkewitz 
(1984, 1991) makes the point that education is often 
seen as a key contributor to processes of social 
change, despite sobering historical analyses that 
reveal ti1e contrary. The 1992 Earth Summit 
concluded that: 
Education is critical for promoting sustainable 
development and improving ti1e capacity of the 
people to address enviro1llllent and development 
issues (UNCED, Agenda 21:221). 
This ii1llllensely appealing rhetoric expresses a 
common and conventional view of cnviro1llllental 
education and what it needs to accomplish: 
... it is also critical for achieving enviro1llllental 
and ethical awareness, values and attitudes, 
skills and behaviour consistent with sustainable 
development (UNCED, Agenda 21: 221). 
It appears that one of the challenges for education ii1 
the 1990's, and beyond, is to translate ti1e rhetoric of 
the reports into reality: to turn the principles of 
sustainable development into reality. Yet, the 
reports seem to be formulating an instrumental or 
deficit view of enviro1llllental education, one in 
which the aim is to feed more information and 
awareness raising experiences into a rather linear 
process of fairly passive learning. Underpinned by 
the belief that raising awareness will lead to 
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appropriate changes in attitudes and values, and 
eventually behaviour; and the implicit assUIIlption 
that there are 'sustainable development' experts who 
know best, the elements of technicism, reductionism, 
individualism and behaviourism are conspicnous 
(lanse van Rensburg, 1994:5). 
The rhetoric of the intergovermnental reports reveals 
assumptions of an essentialist authority (of the 
scientist and the teacher) grounded within an 
Enlightemncnt rationality and an historical project 
pursued chiefly in the name of emancipation, using 
nniversal categories and concepts that set np 
Western, white, middle class men's experiences as 
the norm. 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The concept of sustainable development has become 
a significant part of the debate on global 
environment-development issues. However, the 
meaning of sustainable development and the means 
whereby it is to be realised remain contested. The 
concept has been shaped through the UNCED 
process and the dominant discourse of development, 
which has nncritically connected the two terms 
'development' and 'sustainability' (Firti1 & Plant, 
1994). The United Nations and national 
governments seem to have adopted sustainable 
development witi10ut questioning the assumption 
that growth and further development were necessary, 
let alone the assumption that they were possible 
(Chatterjee & Finger, 1994). The concept is being 
used to politically engineer a social consensus about 
the core values which ought to govern hUIIlan 
interaction with the enviro1llllent across all sectors of 
society: business and C01lllllercial, institutional, 
commnnity and individnal. I argue that we must 
collectively nn-leam much of ti1e dominant 
development paradigm of which modem societies are 
both the product and the victim, which is now 
promoting 'sustainable development' so vigorously; 
and much of which has been absorbed within 
enviromnental education. 
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
There have been many attempts over the years to 
outline and classify the sets of coherent values and 
beliefs (ideologies) which shape environmental 
education and educational research activity generally. 
Recent activity (Fien, 1993b; Huckle, 1995; 
Kemrnis, 1986, 1991; Ke1mnis, Cole & Suggett, 
1983; McTaggart, 1991; Sterling & Cooper, 1992) 
has been helpful iii the identification of different 
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fonns of environmental education and environmental 
education research, and of their potential to 
contribute to processes of social change. Such 
classifications are usually based on Habermas' 
(1972) theory of lmowledge constitutive interests. 
Each of these is related to a philosophical stance that 
questions what Imowledge is, how it is acquired and 
how it is used. Commonly, three orientations are 
recognised, though these orientations are often not 
construed as discrete categories by environmental 
educators, but rather as 'shifting territories'- which 
are closer or further apart from each other, and to a 
greater or lesser extent contested - highlighting the 
inconsistencies and ambiguities within any 
individual's standpoint (Janse van Rensburg, 
1994:7). Drawing on ideological frameworks for the 
solution of environmental problems (Fien l993b) 
and social change (Janse van Rensburg 1994),the 
three major orientations are: 
* vocational/ neo-classical - for the restoration of 
social order, based on technical control and 
prediction; a management orientation, 
* liberal-progressive - for the resolution of 
practical social problems, based on mutual 
understanding and communication; a community 
problem solving orientation, 
* socially critical - for the reconstruction of 
society, based on empowerment and 
emancipation; a critical orientation. 
These different orientations call for different kinds of 
environmental education within schools and they are 
well characterised in the literature (see above). In 
exploring the transformatory roles of environmental 
education Janse van Rensburg (1994) concludes that 
the most prevalent orientations all reveal modernistic 
assumptions which limit their potential to contribute 
to social transformation. 
Elliott (1993:19) has argued that the development of 
environmental education in the last ten years has 
neglected to provide answers to the educational 
questions and issues it poses. He claims that 
environmental education has either been reduced to 
a passive process of knowledge acquisition or 
conflated with the promotion of some version of 
environmentalism, defmed as a particular dogmatic 
set of beliefs about the ideal relationship between 
human beings and their environment. The outcome 
of the latter, Elliott (1993:19) suggests, is that 
educational systems have had difficulties in 
incorporating environmental education at the heart of 
the mainstream school curriculum. As such 
environmental education may suffer the fate of other 
ideologically loaded curriculum development 
enterprises that have emerged in schools, lingered for 
a time, and then vanished (e.g. 'Peace Studies', 
'Development Education' and 'World Studies'). He 
questions whether the promotion of a 'sustainable 
development' perspective in schools is any more 
likely to command the professional and social 
consensus necessary to establish environmental 
education as a major and stable dimension of the 
school curriculum. 
EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
The social, economic, political and ecological 
imperatives of the concept and processes of 
sustainable development have established a renewed 
agenda for environmental education which links it 
very closely with development education. The IUCN 
has described this new direction for environmental 
education as 'education for sustainable living', while 
others prefer to use the term 'education for 
sustainability, (Fien, 1995:23). 
In recognising the significance of the concept of 
sustainability, I do not support the current 
formulation of national and international policies 
around the idea of 'sustainable development'. It is 
vital that educators, researchers and policy-makers 
all seek ways to ameliorate critical socio-ecological 
conditions through a critical exploration of 
sustainability, but I question whether the promotion 
of a 'sustainable development' perspective in 
schools will actually contribute in some way to social 
transformation. Nor do I consider that an 'education 
for sustainability' that promotes a pre-specified and 
pre-scribed set of goals and content an appropriate 
way and form of education most likely to contribute 
in some way to social transition. 
Any reconceptualisation of environmental education 
will also have to be extended to an analysis of the 
relationship between education and the reproduction 
of the environmental values and practices of 
capitalist societies. Trainer (1990, 1994) has argued 
that both the overt and implicit (hidden) curricula of 
schools play a major role in reproducing the 
ecologically unsustainable values of [post-] 
industrial, affluent consumer society. We need to 
recognise that the education system is part of the 
instrumental rationality of late modernity (Firth, 
1995). 
A SOCIALLY CRITICAL ORIENTATION TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
The concern of this paper is with a socially critical 
orientation to environmental education in relation to 
processes of social change, as part of what has often 
been called the 'emancipatory' or 'liberatory' 
educational traditions. Such an orientation concerns 
itself with a critical understanding of society and 
seeks to empower students to participate in a 
democratic transformation (improvement) of society 
(Greenall Gough & Robottom, 1993:301). 
There is evidence that envirorunental education is 
becoming characterised increasingly as socially 
en tical by teacher educators in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Australia and elsewhere (see for example Di 
Chiro, 1987; Greenall Gough, 1990; Fien, 1993a & 
b; Huckle, 1991, 1993; Greenall Gough & 
Robottom, 1993; and Schreuder, 1994). To what 
extent schools are taking a more socially critical 
stance is more difficult to ascertain. 
The most influential orientation is that underpinned 
by the theories of legitimation crisis, knowledge 
constitutive interests and communicative action 
developed by Habern1as (1972). The Deakin-Griffith 
Education Project in Australia demonstrates how 
these theories can advance critical curriculum 
theorising (Fien, 1993a), socially critical 
environmental education ( Greenall Gough & 
Robottom, 1993), research (Robottom & Hart, 
1993) and education for snstainability (Fien, 1993b). 
In the UK socially critical environmental education 
is due mainly to the curriculum development work of 
non-governmental organisations concerned with 
environment and development in association with 
teacher educators. Huckle's (1996) collaboration 
with WWF UK and the production of Reaching Out: 
Education for Sustainability, a professional 
development programme for teachers, is a case in 
point; as is the distance learning professional 
development progranm1e of Firth and Plant (1994) 
Environmemall!.aucation Through Action Enquiry. 
What follows is an outline of critical pedagogy's 
theoretical perspective and historical location, and its 
developing significance for environmental education. 
I t11en explore the implications for critical practices 
of, in particular, the work of Foucault. The paper 
then proceeds to high-light the often implicit 
epistemological stances of the various knowledge 
formations which environmental education has 
drawn on, and to use t11ese to sketch an argument for 
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an empirical epistemology and an agnostic stance to 
knowledge within a socially critical envirorunental 
education. The ultimate aim of the paper is to 
strengthen understanding of and educational practice 
within critical traditions. 
THE WORLD OF THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: PROGRESSANDPARADOX 
The question of schools as transgressive sites 
reflects on an historical moment that is marked by 
'crisis' - of power, patriarchy, authority, identity, 
representation and etl1ies. This historical moment has 
been variously described as late modernity, high 
modernity, reflexive modernity and t11e postmodern. 
While the periodisation of modernity may be a 
matter of some dispute, it is a period characterised as 
tom between the ravages and benefits of modernism, 
as an age in which the notions of science, teclmology 
and reason are associated with not only social 
progress, but also with the excesses of human 
destruction of each other and of sustaining 
environments. It is an historical moment shaped by 
increasingly connected and economically integrated 
global relations, where the relations between its 
centres and margins are being redefined and t11e 
grand narratives of emancipation, whether from t11e 
political left or right, appear to share aifmity with 
oppression and totalitarianism. It is a time which is 
witnessing dran1atic political changes in South 
Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It seems what 
is at stake is a redefrnition of democracy, knowledge 
and of 'progress' itself. 
In the discourses of critical pedagogy the educational 
politics of emancipatory self- and social 
empowerment have, in the main, been articulated in 
epistemic relation to liberal conceptions of equality 
and participatory democracy. Despite the critique of 
liberalism's competitive individualism and 
technocratic rationality the agenda for radical 
pedagogy remains t11e restoration of a 'creati vc 
democracy' (Giroux, (1988: 202). 
Nelson Mandela outlines the struggles for South 
Africa, the massive political and ethical agenda to be 
faced if we arc to make democracy a substantive 
rather t11an a lifeless activity (Giroux, 1992:72). 
Mandela also makes the significant connection 
between democracy and t11e environment: 
At the top of the agenda of the Government's 
Reconstruction and Development Progrannne 
are tl1e people ... The RDP sets out the task of 
meeting the basic needs of everyone in South 
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African society, especially the poorest of our people, 
to develop human resources, to build the economy 
and to democratise state and society. The challenges 
we face are enmmous ... With the establishment 
of a democratic government, the conditions for 
successfully implementing policies of integrated 
environmental management are propitious 
(1995:5). 
Are the recent events in South Africa and Eastern 
Europe representative of part of a broader struggle 
of oppressed peoples against all totalising forms of 
legitimation and cultural practice that deny human 
freedom and collective justice? Are the events calling 
into question all master narratives that make 
totalising claims to emancipation and freedom? Are 
we witnessing the emergence of new political and 
ethical discourses, ones that do not pit socialism 
against capitalism, but democracy against all forms 
of totalitarianism? And what are the implications for 
education? 
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
The field of critical pedagogy is complex and 
fragmentary, but acknowledging the complexity is 
important in countering any suggestion of 'unity' 
within the discussion which follows. At the risk of 
over-simplification, critical pedagogy is positioned 
as that which attends to practices of teaching/ 
learuing intended to interrupt particular historical 
situated systems of oppression. It is specifically 
concerned with societal relations of power and 
inequalities and oriented to collective and avowedly 
political notions of empowerment to effect social 
change. Such pedagogics go by many names: such as 
Freirean, Gramscian, radical, socially critical. With 
both overlaps and specificities within and between, 
each was originally constructed out of a combination 
of first generation Frankfurt School critical theory 
and the negation of false consciousness through 
ideology critique, Gramscian counter-hegemonic 
practice and Freirean conscientisation. 
From Gramsci (1971) critical pedagogy derives an 
amalgamated concept of the subject, which is 
granted common sense, dialectical thinking and 
intellectual possibilities. Hegemonised subjects have 
the potential to contest their ideological positioning 
and historical condition, to assume a counter-
hegemonic position from which to articulate the 
values and interests of subordinate groups. For 
Gramsci, while hegemonic control was powerful, 
diffuse and complex, it was not seamless. For critical 
pedagogy this means that it is within indi victuals and 
the many small but potentially powerful spaces 
within institutions of social and ideological control 
that counter-hegemonic discourses and practices can 
be organised. The school is one site where 
'transformative intellectuals' should elaborate a 
critical language to enable creative and critical 
consciousness amongst students. 
Freire's (1973, 1978) critical pedagogy of 
conscientisation provides radical pedagogy with the 
notion of teaching for critical consciousness. Freire's 
pedagogy begins from, rather than precludes, the 
students' problematisation of knowledge, language 
and lived experience. Its aim is to develop among the 
'Oppressed' language and concepts with which to 
understand the ideological sources of 
disempowerment and voicelessness. 
The above provides a powerful agenda for 
emancipatory education. The target of emancipation 
for Gramsci and Freire are the oppressed working 
class poor. For Frankfurtian critical theory, all 
Western culture was oppressed by a repressive 
technicist and instrumental rationality. Power and 
the sources of domination in all three theoretical 
frameworks reside with ruling class interests 
expressed in both economic and cultural structures 
(Luke, 1992:28). Such critical theory translated into 
a pedagogical agenda argues for a decontextualised 
essentialism, for realism and for a generalised 
emancipation from generalised social oppression and 
psychological repression. 
While critical pedagogy has its roots in Marxian 
analysis of class, more recently there have been 
efforts to appropriate certain strands of the feminist, 
poststructuralist and postmodern critique, in an 
attempt to consider the historically and discursively 
constructed subject and to revitalise two decades of 
radical critique. 
McLaren (1994:321) argues that critical pedagogy 
reveals how mainstream approaches to meaning in 
school settings instantiate a formulaic repetition of 
sameness and reify a world order that represents 
itself as natural and commonsensical. The possibility 
of alternatives is thus denied in the act of turning the 
inert present into a social fate. For the criticalist 
educator, the belief that knowledge is removed from 
history, above politics and hnmune from the realm of 
the ethical, nullifies the potential of classrooms to be 
sites of 'transgressive practices'. Instead they 
reproduce dominant race, class and gender relations 
·and the values of the dominant sociopolitical order. 
Giroux (1992:28) delineates radical pedagogic 
practice as border pedagogy, which is seen as a new 
politics of cultural difference. Here educators are 
seen as cultural workers involved with a project 
intended to mobilise knowledge and desires U1at 
extend the possibilities for creating new public 
spheres within a reformulation of democracy. It is 
attentive to developing a democratic public 
philosophy that respects U1e notion of difference as 
part of a common slruggle to extend the quality of 
public life. It presupposes not merely an 
acknowledgement of the shifting borders that both 
undermine and reterritorialise different 
configurations of culture, power and knowledge. It 
also links the notion of schooling and the broader 
category of education to a more substantive strnggle 
for a radical democratic society. 
Within the field of critical pedagogy today two main 
discursive strands can be recognised 
(Gore,l992:55). The central distinction between the 
two strands centres on different approaches to 
pedagogy. One strand emphasises the articulation of 
broad (and shifting) social and educational visions 
(as exemplified by Giroux and McLaren), while U1e 
other shows greater concern for inslructional 
practices in specific contexts (as exemplified by 
Freiere and Shor). 
CONCERNS WITH CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
THE WORK OF FOUCAULT 
I now want to articulate a number of concerns with 
respect to critical pedagogy, namely: 
* U1e need to re-think the conception of power, 
* the U1eoretical pronouncement of critical 
discourses as emancipatory, 
* the danger of an over-optimistic view of agency, 
* U1e need for a more contextualised consideration 
of empowerment, in terms of subjectivity, 
specific contexts and language. 
Calls to empower students to participate in the 
democratic transformation of society often contain 
realist and essentialist positions regarding 
subjectivity, which are neither acknowledged 
specifically nor developed theoretically. I aim to 
show that frameworks and concepts derived from 
feminist appropriations of postslructuralist 
discourses, especially those of Michel Foucault, 
necessitate and help initiate a re-thinking of 
emancipatory discourses and practices. They offer a 
more sensitive approach to the possibility of 
'emancipation' by an increased awareness of the 
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centrality of language and subjectivity in 
formulations of difference. 
Foucault's work has assumed a significant position 
in the developing 'canon' of the postrnodem, though 
the significance of his writings in terms of their 
implications for educational theory and practice is 
problematic. Foucault himself resisted 
categorisation, and what to make of a set of texts 
which resist grounding and which have engendered 
widely differing responses is itself a postmodern 
challenge. He is a profound critic of the humanistic 
discourses of 'progress', 'emancipation' and 
betterment that govern modem power-knowledge 
formations. His writings provide an analysis of U1e 
emergence and work of modern institutions, and 
although Foucault did not directly focus on the 
school and other educational institutions, aspects of 
his work, both directly and indirectly do address 
educational issues. His concern to go beyond the role 
of language and textuality into an explicit 
consideration of the nature and role of power is 
perhaps one of the reasons why his work has a 
greater and more obvious influence on educational 
writing than other poststrncturalists, Usher and 
Edwards (1994:82-83) address some of the issues in 
critical pedagogy which feminist appropriations of 
Foucault's work are problematised by. 
POWER IN CONTEXT 
Foucault did not provide a ready made formula for 
analysing power in education; his main concern was 
to show U1e way in which modem forms of 
governance and social discipline is brought about in 
modern Western societies. Nevertheless, his work 
does give genuine insight into what we are doing 
with students in the name of education (Marshall, 
1990:25). 
Foucault (I 977) argued that since the end of U1e 
eighteenth century social order has been maintained 
not by overt, cxtemal sovereign or legal power, but 
by far more subtle forms of modem disciplinary 
power. Modem forms of governance and social 
discipline are secured through education (Hoskin 
1990:29). Education replaces coercion and 
subjugation. In this respect Hoskin (1990:29) argues 
that education is not simply what goes on in schools, 
but is an essential part of U1e regulative practices of 
modern institutions. Foucault's work questions U1e 
mirror which modernity holds up to itself, the 
benevolent image of emancipatory practices 
(including education) based on the development of 
the 'rational subject'. Instead, Foucault (1977:80) 
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sees a more 'suspicious' and 'invisible' form of 
social discipline, what he calls technologies and 
apparatuses of social regulation. 
This reconceptualisation of modern institutions is 
largely achieved through rethinking ftrst, the role of 
discourse through wltich practices and objects are 
constituted and deftned and second, the relationsltip 
between power and knowledge. Premodern forms of 
coercion are replaced by 'discipline' which works 
through discursive power-knowledge formations to 
produce modem forms of govemance and social 
control (Usher & Edwards, 1994:84). The notions of 
'power-knowledge', 'discourse' and 'discipline' are 
a framework for the arguments wltich follow. 
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
Modernity's liberal-humanist tradition and 
epistemologies accustom us to seeing knowledge as 
distinct from, indeed as counterposed to, power. In 
this view knowledge is a (disinterested) search for 
truth which power gets in the way of and distorts 
(Usher & Edwards, 1994:84). Foucault was ltighly 
critical of this tradition and argued that such 
epistemologies help to ensure our continued 
domination, because they create the illusion that 
knowledge exists separately from power. Here, 
Foucault saw power as being reifted, being 
constructed as 'a thing'. As 'a thing' power is 
monopolised by some or by certain institutions such 
as the state, who then exercise it coercively over 
others. When power is equated only with force and 
coercion, we have the view that power results in a 
distortion and corruption of knowledge. The 
implication is that 'truth' and 'knowledge' are only 
possible under conditions where power is not 
exercised. In contrast, Foucault argued that an 
inextricable link exists between power and 
knowledge, and in order to emphasise that they are 
two sides of the same process he coined the term 
'power-knowledge': 
Power produces knowledge ... Power and 
knowledge directly imply one another ... There is 
no power relation witl1out the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge tl1at does not presuppose :md 
constitute at the same time, power relations 
(1977:93). 
Foucault inverts, following Nietzsche, the common-
sense view of tl1e relation between power and 
knowledge. We might normally regard knowledge as 
'powerful' - that is, when it represents the world as 
it 'really is' and can lay claim to the status of 'truth' 
- and provides us witl1 tl1e power to do tltings that we 
could not do without. Science is usually considered 
as tl1e means of discovering the 'truth' of the world 
and the knowledge produced is then neutrally 
imparted through the educational system in various 
educational practices and forms. Foucault argues, 
however, that knowledge is a power over others, the 
power to defme others. Knowledge ceases to be a 
liberation and becomes a mode of surveillance, 
regulation, discipline (Sarup, 1993:67). 
This discourse of knowledge, power and truth 
provides a range of very powerful messages for 
education. In education knowledge and truth are the 
basis for empowerment, emancipation and progress; 
truth is gained from knowledge wltich reflects and 
represents the 'real world'; and such knowledge is 
only possible in the absence of power. Once these 
operating assumptions are present, oilier ways of 
constructing knowledge and 'truth' are marginalised 
by tltis 'one true path to trutll', 'litis one true story'. 
Such powerful discourses Foucault referred to as 
'reginles of trutll'. All tile major forms of 
disciplinary knowledge are seen as 'regimes of 
truth'. Foucault links tl1e technologies of power with 
the emergence of the disciplines of knowledge, 
arguing tllat the disciplines take people as botll their 
object and tlleir subject. 
Power and knowledge are correlative, tl1ey are 
always found together in 'regimes of trutl1'. 
Knowledge, tllerefore does not simply represent tile 
truth of what is, but rather, constitutes what is taken 
to be true. For Foucault, it is what counts as true tl1at 
is important. He counters tile idea that truth is tile 
outcome of methodologically controlled rational 
investigation, emphasising tile 'production' of trutll, 
a complex process operating at a multiplicity of 
levels (Usher & Edwards, 1994:87). 
In describing tile disciplines as 'regimes of truL.'J' 
Foucault alerts us to the politics of knowledge 
(discourses). Modernity's discourses of power, truth 
and knowledge are tllns brought into question, and 
are challenged in tlleir self-representation as 
transltistorical foundations upon wltich to base 
understanding and 'progress', because they remove 
from debate tile conditions of tlleir own existence. It 
is in tllis sense that tile separation of knowledge and 
power can be seen as a crucial part of tl1e 
metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984), the cultural legacy 
of the Enlightenment tllat continues to provide tile 
siguiftcations t11at shape modern educational 
rationality and practices. 
Foucault also draws our attention to the status of tl1e 
individual within modem Western society. The 
emergence of the modem emphasis on the individual 
presupposes tl1e individual as the privileged point of 
reference in social formations. It is taken to be a sign 
of the gradual liberation from communal practices 
and beliefs, a liberation that allowed individuals to 
be 'themselves'. Foucault attempted to demonstrate 
the ignoble origins of the modern individual: 
... the individual is no doubt the fictitious atom 
of an 'ideological' representation of society, but 
he (sic) is also a reality, fabricated by tllis 
specific technology of power that I have called 
'discipline' (Foucault, 1977: 194). 
He presented the individual not as a sign of 
increasing rational autonomy, but as a sign that one 
fonn of social control had been transforn1ed into 
another. 
The rationality accompanying these disciplinary and 
individualising technologies is interested primarily in 
efficiency and productivity tl1rough a system of 
'normalisation' (Foucault in Gordon, 1980:104-8). 
This normative rationality has, Foucault claims, 
become an integral part of such state apparatuses as 
medicine, law and education. But what does all tllis 
mean at the level of the school or the classroom? 
Traditionally power has often been thought of in 
negative terms, as sovereign. Some of the early 
'resistance' or 'liberatory' work in education 
conceived of power as a possession or property, 
something the teacher has and can give to pupils. To 
em-power suggests tl1at power can be given, 
provided, controlled, held, conferred and taken away 
(Gore, 1992:57). Power as property is often, but not 
necessarily connected with a 'zero-sum' 
understanding of power, which suggests that tl1ere is 
only so much power, and that if teachers 'give' some 
to students, they must 'give up' or 'give away' some 
of their power. Foucault (1980) amongst others has 
reconceptualised power which reveals weaknesses of 
the property and zero-sum conceptions. Instead of 
conceiving of power as a possession or a commodity, 
a tlling to be held or exchanged, Foucault has argued 
that power only exists in action, it is relational; 
Power must be analysed as something which 
circulates, or rather as something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never 
located here or there, never in anybody's hands, 
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of 
wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
tlrrough a net-like organisation. And not only do 
individuals circulate between its threads; they 
SouthcrnAfr.J.Env.Edu., 16.,1996 17 
are always in tl1e position of simultaneously 
m1dergoing and exercising tllis power. They are 
not only its inert or consenting target. They are 
always also tl1e elements of its articulation. In 
otl1er words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application (1980:98). 
POWER-KNOWLEDGE FORMATIONS AND 
EDUCATION 
This articulation of power tends to contrast sharply 
with a more traditional monarcllical or sovereign 
conception of power subsumed within many 
emancipatory discourses in education. Power in the 
sovereign sense is overt and external and students 
are perceived as lacking power, thus requiring some 
intervention by the teacher. The intention is to 
'empower' students to find and articulate tl1eir own 
voices, to take appropriate action, to see how they 
have been dominated by those with power. Gore 
(1992:56) contends that the term empowerment, 
more generally presupposes: 
* an agent of empowerment, separate from a 
subject or a context, 
* a notion of power as property, 
* some kind of vision or desirable end state, and 
* that the discourses of critical pedagogy construct 
empowerment in ways consistent with tl1ese 
underlying and inter-related presuppositions. 
To em-power denotes to give or delegate power or 
authority to, to give ability to, to enable or pernlit. 
As such, it is a process which requires an agent, and 
someone or something, to empower. Even the notion 
of 'self-empowerment' presumes an agent - the self. 
Within education, even the 'sometl1ing' (such as a 
context for self empowerment) requires the provision 
by an agent. The agent is generally the teacher. The 
subject of empowerment (who is to be empowered) 
is generally expressed in terms of the individual 
student and the social, as exemplified by Greenall 
Gough and Robottom (1993:301): socially critical 
environmental education seeks to empower students 
to participate in a democratic transfonnation of 
society. The student and social empowerment 
distinguishes between and connects the 
empowerment of individuals and social positions. 
Theoretically Foucault's analysis of power raises 
questions about the possibility of empowering. It 
refutes the idea that one can give power to another. 
Thus to accept a view that one's work can give 
power (as property) to otl1ers is overly simplistic and 
is not representative of tl1e operation of power within 
society. Foucault's conception of power as 
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'circulating', 'exercised through a net like-
organisation', existing only in action, highlights that 
empowerment cannot mean the giving of power. It 
could, however, mean the exercise of power in an 
attempt to help others to exercise power. As such, 
Foucault's conception of power does not preclude 
purposeful and politically motivated action, but it 
does point out the possibility that the purposes may 
not be attained; that we might not be successful. In 
constructing power as exercised, the uncertainties, 
the unforeseeable, and the contradictions are brought 
to the fore. Yet how these feature within socially 
critical learning contexts is rarely considered. It is 
not at all clear that we can achieve anything. In 
attempts to empower, we have to acknowledge that 
our agency has very real limits, no matter what our 
aims or how we go about 'empowering', our efforts 
are likely to be partial and inconsistent. 
The analysis also raises questions about procedures 
involving the exercise of power to help others to 
exercise power. Conceiving of power as exercised 
points itmnediately to the need for empowerment to 
be context-specific and related to practices. But even 
within the principles of critical pedagogy where 
negotiated learning takes place through student-
centred activities (active/experiential learning) based 
on a constructionist view of knowledge, the agency 
of a teacher is still present. As a 'project organiser 
and resource person' or whatever label one might 
wish to use ['facilitator' - Ed.], the teacher organises 
critical and collaborative activities in negotiation 
with students and community. But does the agency 
of the teacher contaminate the specific situation? All 
too often, the issue of agency is forgotten. Problems 
can arise, for example, when students are involved in 
the collection and recording of data, in the discussion 
and analysis of behaviour which is assumed to be 
'normal', that is, not a production affected by the 
learning process. But do students, teachers and 
others move away from their 'vernacular' or normal 
behaviour during critical learning encounters? Do 
such critical learning encounters produce a distortion 
of unself-conscious action? Does 'the actual' 
situation become a production, a simulation? 
Understanding power as exercised, as relational, 
rather than as possessed, requires attention to these 
concerns, to the microdynarnics of the operation of 
power as it is exercised in particular sites; instead of 
the tendency within some approaches to critical 
pedagogy to decontextualise empowem1ent. 
Further, if empowerment is constructed as the 
exercise of power in an attempt to help others to 
exercise power (rather than the giving of power), and 
having established the distinction between those who 
aim to exercise power (teachers) to assist 'others' to 
exercise power (students), this immediately sets up 
a distinction between 'us' and 'them'. As a given in 
any relation which aims at empowerment, the agent 
becomes problematic when the us/them relationship 
is conceived as requiring a focus ouly on 'them' 
(Gore, 1992:61). Are we to assume that the agent is 
already empowered and so apart from those who are 
to be empowered? There is a danger here, both in 
the work of the teacher with students, and in ti1e 
work of teacher educators attempting to 'facilitate' 
the 'empowerment' of teachers ti1rough research in 
the classroom. In ti1e focus on Others there is the 
danger offorgetting to critically exanline one's own 
work (or one's group's work) and one's own 
(group's) implication in the conditions one seeks to 
change (improve). Consciousness of our own (as 
writers, scholars, facilitators, educators) complicity 
in the very structures of power that we are 
attempting to deconstruct often tends to slip away 
unnoticed. In the well intentioned focus on 
empowering others, ti1ere is a danger of overlooking 
the normalismg tendencies of all discourses. 
AN AGNOSTIC STANCE TO KNOWLEDGE 
Building on the above and a broader analysis of 
subject and subjectivity, language and the 
importance of content, I will now outline the 
significance of an empirical epistemology and an 
agnostic (others have used relativism, scepticism) 
stance to knowledge within a socially critical 
orientation to environmental education. This is done 
by highlighting the often implicit epistemological 
stances of the various knowledge formations which 
environmental education draws on. For reasons of 
space, I shall merely describe the stances briefly, 
inevitably distorting them somewhat as I do so. 
As Kurzman (1992:268) argues, 'to know' is to 
commit oneself to a belief and to commit oneself to 
the separate belief that ti1e first belief describes an 
aspect of reality. Thus there are two aspects to 
knowledge: what Kurzman calls the commitulent-
factor and the truth-factor. That said, there seems to 
be three general attitudes to knowledge; 
* that the same knowledge is justified for everyone 
(moulsm), 
* that each 'community' is justified in having its 
own knowledge (pluralism), 
* and that knowledge cannot be justified 
(agnosticism, also called relativism or 
scepticism). 
Monism is distinguishable by the easy assumption 
that knowledge is justified. There are various monist 
theories of knowledge, but they all have a 
cmmnitment to the justifiability of knowledge's truth 
factor, that is they justify knowledge by its relation 
to truth. Monist theories are all foundational in one 
sense (see Firth, 1995 for a consideration of the 
signitlcance of foundationalism), in that they all 
assert that knowledge can be justified, based on 
sufficient conditions for knowledge. A number of 
different strategies are deployed to specify 
conditions (presuppositions) that suftice to make 
knowledge's truth-content probable, not certain, as 
the anti-monist caricature would normally have it. 
The strategies include: 
* self-evident items of knowledge - some 
knowledge is self-justifying: based on sense 
experiences that justify themselves and serve as 
the foundation on which all other knowledge 
may be based; but in claiming such self-evidency 
ie that certain propositions are 
'epistemologically in the clear', this denies that 
questions may be raised about such 
propositions; it seems to avoid the issue of how 
knowledge is justified; 
* internal coherence - knowledge that fits with the 
system is true: where the truth of a judgement is 
justified by its harmonising with all the other 
judgements we make about reality; however, it is 
not at all clear that our beliefs form a coherent 
conceptual system in the first place; furthermore, 
if the system justit1es the individual 
propositions, what justifies the system? The 
existence of a conceptual scheme docs not 
ensure that it approximates the truth; 
* practical success - lasting knowledge is true: 
here the basic idea is that knowledge is logically 
necessary if any occurrence or set of occurrences 
is ever to afford evidence in favour of any other 
occurrence. Inevitably efficiency (whether in 
terms of basic survival or the attainment of 
specific goals) has and will continue to weed out 
knowledge that does not conform to reality. But 
again the practical success argument leaves 
much of what we claim to know unjustified. 
The overall argument is Uwt we need to establish 
sufficient conditions for knowledge and having done 
so, certain theories simply accord better with the 
'truth', and are thus good for everybody. 
Unfortunately, this argument of sufficient conditions 
for knowledge seems to avoid or distance the whole 
issue of the fact that the justifiability of knowledge's 
truth-factor is inherently a human action. Pluralism, 
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on the other hand, generally stresses the justit1ability 
of the commitment factor rather than the truth factor. 
Agnosticism argues Umt neither the truth-factor nor 
the commitment-factor is justifiable. 
Pluralism and agnosticism both critique monism. 
Pluralism focuses on the commitment-factor of 
knowledge and argues U1at different social and 
cultural groups claim to know the world differently, 
and that no one way of knowing the world is more 
justified than any other. Pluralists usually justify the 
different systems of knowledge as necessary in order 
to achieve certain goals. Knowledge is thus justified 
by its necessity. Agnosticism critiques both monism 
and pluralism. Anti-monism is shared with 
pluralism, arguing that different people claim to 
know the world differently, and no one way of 
knowing the world is more justified than any oU1er 
way. But agnosticists do not accept the pluralist 
solution that knowledge is justitied by its 
compuismy acceptance within each social group, that 
achievement of the desired goal justifies the 
commiunent- factor of knowledge. They emphasise 
the multiplicity of systems of knowledge within each 
socio-cuitural group and the internal contradictions 
of each system of knowledge. 
The commitment-factor of knowledge is only 
actually necessary if there arc no noncommittal ways 
to achieve the desired end. The agnostic position 
being argued for here is that people believe things, 
agnostics believe things, and there is nothing wrong 
with this, but there is no need to claim that U1ese 
beliefs are justified. The reason for arguing for such 
a position is that it brings to t11e fore the question, if 
lo:wwledge cannot be justified, then how does it 
come to be accepted as snch? It allows statements of 
belief or of persuasion to appear as themselves in 
various forms, such as 'I believe', or 'I a111 
convinced', but not as a statement of justi11ed 
knowledge. In this way, we can focus on other 
concerns than the justification of knowledge, na111ely, 
the ways in which particular knowledge claims are 
accepted. 
Fuller (1993:xvi) first drew my attention to t11e 
significance of an agnostic stance in his discussion 
of rhetorically effective theorising: 
The power of the great philosophical theories of 
the twentieth century - Marxism, pragmatism, 
logical positivism, existentialism and 
structuralism - lay not in the truth of their 
specific doctrines but in U1e ability of their 
procedural languages ... to get people from quite 
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different walks of life to engage in projects of mutual 
interest. 
Kurzman (1992:78) suggests there are four factors 
in the acceptance of any particular item of 
knowledge: 
* its relation to the 'real world', 
* itsnovelty, 
* its social and theoretical context, 
* its phrasing or rhetoric. 
The first, the relation to the 'real world', is a 
reference to the evidence that can be accumulated in 
support of a particular knowledge claim. it is a 
common occurrence that most knowledge claims can 
find some evidence in its favour, so this is not 
always the crucial factor, though it is also usually the 
case that theories with more evidence in their favour 
tend to have an advantage over theories with less. 
The second factor, novelty, refers to the persuasive 
power that something new often has, so to outline a 
new approach is sometimes an effective strategy. 
The 'global knowledge explosion' in more recent 
years coupled with new information technology 
makes the novelty factor even more significant, 
though the task of actually keeping up to date with 
developments is made more difficult. The social and 
theoretical contexts, which are closely intertwined, 
refer to tl1e background against which the knowledge 
claim is presented. For example, docs it conform to 
the general thinking of the day, or is it a direct 
challenge to extant knowledge? Who is it being 
articulated by? What advantage or disadvantage 
could acceptance result in? While it is obvious that 
context is important, it is difficult to spell out which 
particular contexts are more conducive to tl1e 
acceptance of knowledge-claims. The final factor, 
rhetoric, has already been emphasised. It raises the 
question, what constitutes effective rhetoric? An 
empirical epistemology should try to take these 
points of view and to figure out tl1eir relative power 
and interrelations. 
REGIMES OF TRUTH 
I have sketched out one way in which an agnostic 
stance to knowledge could be shaped. The main 
concem for me, given tl1at there is no justification for 
lmowledge, is tl1e question of how some items or 
systems of knowledge, and not others, come to be 
accepted as such by people and to what effect. 
(Kurzman, 1992:278). TI1e value in such a position 
as I see it, is the move away from epistemic status 
(the nature of authority) that is associated with either 
justification as an esoteric set of presuppositions or 
by necessity; which also calls into question the value 
of being a mere possessor or consumer of 
knowledge. Instead, it allows me to reconfigure a 
conception of knowledge that is transactionary and 
concerned with what deteffilines what people believe. 
This throws up into sharper relief the subject, 
language, context and power. They become more 
transparent. Such a recoufignration could assist in 
keeping the channels of communication open 
between sectors of society that to me seem 
increasingly susceptible to incollllllensurability. In 
turn, this has implications for how one thinks about 
the ends of education. It may even alter tl1e character 
of the knowledge produced, including what we take 
something to be when we call it 'knowledge'. 
Rather than seeking to legitimate or celebrate 
particular discourses, an agnostic stance would want 
to look for tl1eir dangers, tl1eir 'normalising' 
tendencies, for how they might serve as instruments 
of domination despite the intentions of their creators 
(Sawacki, 1988). The stance draws on Foucault's 
(1980) notion of 'regime of truth'. In pointing to tl1e 
nexus of power and knowledge, regime of truth 
highlights tl1e potential dangers and normalising 
tendencies of all discourses, including those which 
aim to liberate. Foucault (1980:131,133) explains 
regime of truth as: truth is linked to in circular 
relation with systems of power which produce and 
sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces 
and which extend it. Further, 
Each society has its regime of truth, its general 
politics of truth: t11at is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each is sanctioned; t11e techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of tl10se who are charged with 
saying what counts as true. 
The use of Foucault's notion of regime of trutll 
demands greater attention to the contexts in which 
empowerment is advocated and/or attempted 
(practised). 
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION 
While I will continue to use socially critical forms of 
environmental education in my work as a teacher 
educator and to support such approaches within 
schools, I do heed Foucault's critique. I have 
identified some specific practices through which 
critical pedagogy can have effects of regulation, of 
domination, despite the 'emancipatory' intentions of 
those who are implicated in its use. 
By the use of the term 'critical' or socially critical 
environmental education, I do not imply any 
teleological view of history (Marxist), whereby the 
critique of existing social relations is a stimulus to 
the process by which the ideal immanent in history 
will become a reality, through particular groups 
within society (intellectuals and the working class). 
In this case, in my view, the 'emancipatory' space 
within which individuals are to be mobilised into 
collective action is seen somehow to be located 
outside of discourse and history and exterior to 
power inscriptions. I do not subscribe to such 
liberatory definitions of critical pedagogy. 
Rather, I place an emphasis on discourses of clitique 
and possibility: my concern as an educator is to 
illuminate the political circumstances obtaining when 
knowledge is produced and to develop inquiry 
approaches that counter the 'naturalisation' tendency 
of so much learning. This foregrounds for young 
people the relations among knowledge, authority and 
power in the generation of knowledge. As Foucault 
(1983) stressed, we are working within a time which 
is noteworthy for its disturbing of the formerly 
secure foundations of our knowledge artd 
understanding. I view critical approaches to 
education in such a frame. 
Further, what makes a learning process educationally 
worthwhile is that it not only fosters certain human 
powers and abilities, but does so in relation to the 
things that matter in life. This is not a neutral, value 
free standpoint (if that is not a contradiction of 
terms). There can be no such position. I have argued 
that to adopt a socially critical position, to politicise, 
means not to bling politics in where there were none, 
but to make overt how power permeates the 
construction and legitimation of know ledges. What 
a critical approach foregrounds is the inescapability 
of how our invested positionality shapes our rhetoric, 
theory and practice; and this must include the 
discourses of those of us who embrace the term 
'critical'. 
How human beings live in relation to their 
enviro11111ent is so important that the questions and 
issues it poses can only be properly addressed when 
people bling certain critical qualities of thought and 
action to bear on them. The best contexts for 
developing those qualities through education are the 
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ones in whlch they will need to be employed in adult 
life (Elliott, 1993: 18). 
The development of such a cnrricnl11111 response 
requires a dynamic and socially critical leaming 
process rather than one based on the transmission of 
immanent knowledge. Pedagogy can 'naturalise' a 
state of affairs, silence students' voices and prevent 
access to the discourse relaying power. It is this 
appearance of 'the natural', its constrnctedness and 
its relationship to the classroom and pedagogy, that 
I now turn. 
Pedagogy in this more critical sense draws attention 
to questions concerning who is in control over the 
conditions for the production of knowledge (Giroux, 
1992). The processes by which knowledge is 
produced are universally embedded in our need to 
understand ourselves, our places in the world and our 
relations with others. Through our observations we 
construct representations of the self and the world. 
Education locates these processes within a culturally 
defined institutionalised context. 
Tinough critical pedagogy our attention is occupied 
with the relations of autholity which secure 
professional, pedagogical and political status. In this 
way, at the centre of the educational process is the 
context of knowledge production. If we detach 
enviro11111ental education from the political 
circumstances obtaining when knowledge is 
produced, w~. are not involved in an educational 
process. Learning is rednced to the passi vc 
experience of acquiring inert, immanent, but 
politically loaded knowledge, later to be applied to 
real life. The values which have produced thls 
knowledge are hidden from view by a scientific 
rationality. They are 'naturalised', but as Connor 
(1993:34) notes, they have not disappeared, U1cy 
have been driven into the critical unconscions -
continuing to exercise power and force, without 
being available for scrutiny. Young people, if U1ey 
are to help build alternative and better futures must 
have the opportunity to overcome this 'naturalisation' 
tendency: distortions of thought, processes and 
relationships. 
Through critical pedagogy learning becomes a 
dynamic experience of critiquing and creating 
knowledge, and is inevitably conditioned by the 
values which structure our everyday experience of 
living and the practical issues and concerns which 
emerge from such experience. If schools wish to find 
the answer to the motivations of young people 
towards social participation, to realise the potential 
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of their agency, then they need to understand how the 
experiences of the young and their social location 
(family, school, workplace, community) are 
represented to them by the cultures in which they live 
and those which they construct themselves. 
This foregrounds the intertwining of subject, 
language, context and power. In making these more 
transparent through the educational process, young 
people realise that truth docs not precede the notion 
of representation, and through their own subjectivity 
can begin to realise how they relate to others. This 
allows us to reconfigure a conception of knowledge 
which is transactionary and is concerned with what 
determines what people believe. The need for 
formative narratives that provide the basis for 
historically and relationally placing individuals and 
groups inside some common project may then be 
within reach. 
I do not claim that education can be 'emancipatory' 
or bring about social change. I do assume an 
interactive relationship between thinking ['theory'] 
and actual social life, but not in the traditional sense 
of critical theory which pronounces theory 
[appropriate] as emancipatory (usually via 
'transformatory intellectuals') in so far as it enables 
actors to redefme their situations and see new 
possibilities for choice. For me the interactive 
relationship is problematic. 
Here, I am in accord with Janse van Rensburg 
(1994) and conceptualise environmental education as 
developing the capacity for change, rather than as 
intervention to bring about change. (She has 
identified this fourth emerging orientation within a 
recent empirical study of approaches to 
environmental education and research within 
Southern Africa.) Environmental education is seen as 
a collaborative and reflexive search for solutions, 
where social processes of change become the focus 
for research and education. It emphasises the 
importance of a more contextualised consideration of 
'empowerment' in terms of subjectivity, language, 
specific contexts and a reconceptualisation of power. 
The significance of this is not a romantic hope for 
'liberation', but a conceptualisation of a cultural 
strategy to help young people construct possibilities 
for change in their own lives, by using curriculum 
and pedagogy to challenge received ways of thinking 
and institutionalised assumptions. Such a strategy 
highlights for young people the social 
constructedness of what, through its 
institutionalisation, appears to be natural. 
TO CLOSE 
Classrooms are neither ripe for revolution nor for 
mindless complicity (Mclaren, 1994:321). The 
emancipatory potential of critical pedagogy is not 
something to be regarded as a dogma, as if truth 
could be guaranteed. Critical pedagogy is a notion, 
not a thing. As a notion, it does no more than give 
form to a particular kind of democratic aspiration: to 
engage in changing the world as well as interpreting 
it. It offers an embryonic, local form of cormecting 
educational activities with social and political action 
in complex practical circumstances. 
Ultimately critical pedagogy is a structuring 
principle of educational and social life, one which 
can help us to address tough times ahead by 
requiring us to grapple simultaneously with the 
contradictions, constraints and limitations of our 
ideas, theories, and practices, of our words and our 
world. 
Environmental education is about social change. If 
education is to seriously address the socio-ecological 
'crisis' we do need to rethink the nature of 'progress' 
and other modernist ideas. We do need to change 
society, make it more sustainable. But it will not be 
easy. The identification of the centrality of 
subjectivity, identity politics and formative 
narratives in the work of schooling, is to emphasise 
some crucial unsettled issues confronting educators 
in search of emancipatory pedagogics today. In 
advocating the continuing relevance of critical 
pedagogy, we need to seek ways of exercising power 
toward the fulfilment of our espoused aims which 
include self-criticism, scepticism, humility and the 
notion of possibility. 
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NOTES: 
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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 13th Annual Conference of the Environmental 
Education Association of Southern Africa, Durban, South Africa, 18-21 July 1995. 
2 In my work I have attempted to synthesise an explicitly social constructionist perspective witl1 political 
economy in order to examine the rise of a wide range of environmental-development issues and problems 
within the context of the social conditions of the late twentieth century. In opting for such an approach, I 
have conceptualised the environment as a site for a repertoire of definitional and contestatory activities 
(tl1eoretical and operational) many of which are increasingly taldng place in a global context. This 
standpoint docs not discredit the notion of a socio-ecological 'crisis' or the environmental issue..o;;; and the 
environmental claims that are made around these. Rather, it is a contextual position, the emphasis being to 
understand how they are created, legitimised and contested. 
3 In using the term democracy here, I am not denoting an allegiance to a liberal conception, rather the 
emphasis is on redefinition or reconfiguration of democracy as a site for struggle and the need to reclaim 
it in terms that take seriously the issue of difference. 
Editors' note: This paper has been substantially shortened from the extensive review of socially critical environmental 
education and post-modern critique submitted by the author following his presentation on agnostic conceptions of 
knowledge at the EEASA '95 conference. The full paper is available upon request. 
